bepress university libraries

DigitalCommons@bepress
NIU Test
8-15-2016

Misfit and milestones: structural elaboration and capability
reinforcement in the evolution of entrepreneurial top management
teams
Amanda J. Ferguson
N/A Cohen. Lisa E.
M. Diane Burton
Christine M. Beckman

Follow this and additional works at: https://testing.bepress.com/niu_test

Recommended Citation
Ferguson, Amanda J.; Cohen. Lisa E., N/A; Burton, M. Diane; and Beckman, Christine M., "Misfit and
milestones: structural elaboration and capability reinforcement in the evolution of entrepreneurial top
management teams" (2016). NIU Test. 2024.
https://testing.bepress.com/niu_test/2024

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@bepress. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NIU Test by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@bepress.

r Academy of Management Journal
2016, Vol. 59, No. 4, 1430–1450.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2014.0526

MISFIT AND MILESTONES: STRUCTURAL ELABORATION
AND CAPABILITY REINFORCEMENT IN THE EVOLUTION
OF ENTREPRENEURIAL TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS
AMANDA J. FERGUSON
Northern Illinois University
LISA E. COHEN
McGill University
M. DIANE BURTON
Cornell University
CHRISTINE M. BECKMAN
University of Maryland
We examine how “top management team (TMT) misfit,” or discrepancies between the
TMT’s functional roles and the qualifications of the managers who fill those roles, affects
the evolution of TMT composition and structure in a longitudinal study of entrepreneurial
ventures. We distinguish two types of misfit—overqualification and underqualification—
and study how each is associated with TMT changes. We further consider the moderating
effect of firm development. Results reveal that underqualified TMTs hire new managers to
reinforce existing capabilities whereas overqualified TMTs elaborate their role structures.
However, achieving developmental milestones (i.e., obtaining venture capital funding
and staging an initial public offering) is a critical contingency to TMT change: absent
these milestones, firms neither hire new managers nor add roles, even when they
seemingly need to do so. These findings contribute to knowledge of how TMTs and new
ventures evolve by underscoring the importance of simultaneously attending to TMT
composition and structure.

2014). TMT expertise drives strategic decisions and is
a signal to important stakeholders (Beckman, Burton,
& O’Reilly, 2007; Boeker, 1997). Role structures can
enable coordination and help firms manage dynamic
environments (Bechky, 2006; Cohen, 2013; Sine,
Mitsuhashi, & Kirsch, 2006). Both are worthy of investigation independently and in conjunction.
When TMT composition and roles are not aligned,
new ventures may have a need or an opportunity to
change. Misalignment between TMT composition
and role structure—which we label TMT misfit—
signifies a gap between what the TMT intends to
do and what it is capable of doing. A deficit of qualifications relative to the current role structure,
or underqualification, reflects unmet skill requirements, while an excess of qualifications relative to
the role structure, or overqualification, represents
opportunity. In some instances, the TMT may need
to augment its expertise because of weaknesses in
composition; in other situations, there may be an opportunity to develop and elaborate the role structure

The top management teams (TMTs) of new ventures perform a constant balancing act between fulfilling immediate needs and seizing opportunities,
and they must do so in a context of constrained resources. One factor they may work to balance is the
TMT itself: specifically, matching their own skills
with the formal role structure in which they work.
Although researchers frequently treat TMT expertise
and roles as interchangeable, recent evidence suggests that they are conceptually and empirically
distinct (e.g., Beckman & Burton, 2011; Bunderson &
Sutcliffe, 2002; Crossland, Zyung, Hiller, & Hambrick,
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given the qualification on the team. Thus, we ask,
“How and when do entrepreneurial TMTs adjust
their people and roles in response to TMT misfit?”
Two readily apparent adjustments are: (1) hiring
new managers into the existing role structure to enhance team capabilities, and (2) adding new roles to
recognize and allow for fuller use of existing capabilities. We expect that TMT misfit will affect the
level of both; however, these adjustments require
managerial attention and financial resources that are
often in short supply. Therefore, changes to TMT
composition and structure likely vary with the new
venture’s level of development. As new ventures
pass key developmental milestones such as obtaining venture capital financing or staging an initial
public offering, they acquire financial-, human-, and
social-capital resources (e.g., Gompers & Lerner, 2001;
Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Wasserman, 2003) that facilitate attracting newcomers and/or elaborating role
structures. It may be that, without the resources obtained through these developmental milestones,
firms are unable to obtain the expertise they need or
take advantage of opportunities. Thus, we ask a second question: “How do the patterns of response to
TMT misfit vary with the level of resources available
in the firm?”
We examine the effects of TMT misfit on TMT
composition and structure in high-technology entrepreneurial firms and consider these effects in light
of whether the firms have passed the developmental
milestones of achieving venture capital financing
and staging an initial public offering. Our findings
reveal that underqualified TMTs reinforce their
current expertise by hiring new managers without
expanding the role structure, whereas overqualified
TMTs elaborate their structure without hiring new
managers. We also find that firms are more likely to
respond to the needs for new expertise revealed by
underqualified TMTs than to the opportunities for
role elaboration provided by overqualified TMTs.
Ventures that have not achieved developmental
milestones, however, make few changes to the TMT,
even if it is characterized by misfit. This presents
a professionalization paradox: even if a firm needs
or wants to make changes that would signal its
level of professionalization and so help it reach developmental milestones that bring an influx of resources (Chen, Hambrick, & Pollock, 2008; Khaire,
2010; Zott & Huy, 2007), it is unlikely to do so when it
lacks the very resources it seeks to attract. In short,
misfit TMTs need to balance their own composition and structure, but are constrained in their
ability to do so.
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Our study contributes to entrepreneurship theory
by adding important nuances to arguments about the
evolution of new venture TMTs. In particular, while
extant literature confounds people and roles when
considering the evolution of TMT characteristics,
our approach not only acknowledges theoretical
distinctions between team members and their roles,
but also empirically models the match between the
two to better explain the factors that drive change.
Indeed, our study reveals that assuming alignment
between these characteristics is inaccurate and can
mask some of the distinct processes that shape both
hiring and role additions in new venture TMTs.
Further, while extant research considers the role of
firm development in shaping TMTs, it does so
without considering how this interacts with the internal aspects of the TMT. Our study considers
whether and how managers and roles in new ventures may be misfitting, in conjunction with the
venture’s current stage of development, to provide
a more complete understanding of TMT evolution
and its paradoxes. Beyond contributing to entrepreneurship theory, however, highlighting TMT misfit
and its effects also has implications for theories of
organizational role structures, upper echelons, and
misfit, and ultimately helps to answer the important
question of why TMTs “look the way they do”
(Hambrick, 2007; Pettigrew, 1992).
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
New Venture TMT Evolution
The characteristics of TMTs are rarely static, and
nowhere might they change more than in new ventures. For example, in its earliest days, a new venture’s
TMT might comprise a couple of college dropouts
or unemployed individuals (Dencker, Gruber, &
Shah, 2009a, 2009b); however, over time, the firm
might bring in more seasoned professional managers (Hellmann & Puri, 2002). Such compositional
changes have been tied to factors such as the team’s
industry experience or functional diversity (Boeker &
Wiltbank, 2005), new venture growth (Boeker &
Karichalil, 2002), and the achievement of developmental milestones such as obtaining venture capital
financing (Wasserman, 2003). Changes to TMTs in new
firms may also come in the form of altering role
structures (Baker & Nelson, 2005). For example,
Beckman and Burton (2008) found that new venture
TMTs that began with a limited set of functional positions had difficulty developing more complete
role structures later on. We argue that any changes
to composition and structure follow from some
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combination of need and opportunity for change,
and that these needs and opportunities can be
captured by considering the fit between the TMT’s
formal roles and the qualifications of the managers
who fill those roles.
TMT Misfit and TMT Change
Frequently, scholars assume that the functional
backgrounds of top managers and the functional
roles of the TMT are brought into alignment at the
time of hiring. For example, Menz (2012) suggested
that TMT roles are determined a priori by the CEO
and then filled by suitable individual executives.
However, in practice, the functional backgrounds of
the top managers often diverge from the functional
role structure of the TMT, particularly in new ventures. Some TMTs are comprised of top managers
who possess narrow functional expertise, despite
holding roles that indicate a broader range of responsibility. Other TMTs may be made up of broad
generalists, with prior functional experiences above
and beyond the roles they currently hold (see
Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002). Both scenarios suggest
that mismatches between TMT roles and people can
and do occur, and we argue that these discrepancies
(i.e., TMT misfit) may represent needs or opportunities for TMT change.
We define “TMT misfit” as any situation in which
the composite knowledge, skills, and abilities of top
managers do not correspond to the set of roles that
they occupy. As such, TMT misfit is conceptualized
at the team level, assessing the set of functional
qualifications and role requirements of the TMT as
a whole. This focus on misfit at the team level is a
departure from prior work in the person–environment
fit literature, which primarily focuses on matches
between individuals and their jobs or organizations (Chatman, 1991; Edwards, 1991; Kristof-Brown,
Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005). However, a grouplevel conceptualization of TMT misfit is important
here because it captures overall TMT capability
relative to its stated formal structure, and thus the
potential for change in people and roles.
TMT misfit may occur in two directions: that is,
there may be an excess or a deficit of qualifications
with respect to existing TMT role structures. Again,
we depart from the person–environment fit literature
here, which largely focuses on underqualification
(Erdogan, Bauer, Peiró, & Truxillo, 2011). However,
considering both TMT overqualification and TMT
underqualification is important in that they represent fundamentally different problems. With TMT
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underqualification, stated goals cannot be met with
the qualifications and associated human capital
currently in the team, indicating an underlying need
for change. With TMT overqualification, the TMT is
currently fulfilling its formalized role requirements
yet has extra qualifications. As such, the TMT could
potentially achieve additional goals by fully capitalizing on the qualifications of current managers
(Erdogan et al., 2011), indicating an unrealized opportunity for change.
To date, research on TMT change has studied two
broad phenomena: succession as an organizational
response to underqualified managers (Boeker &
Karichalil, 2002; Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Wasserman,
2003) and the hiring of experts into new roles (Baron,
Burton, & Hannan, 1999; Zorn, 2004). Both approaches conflate people with roles. Turnover studies
treat roles as static and examine hiring and exits
within established roles. Studies of new functional
roles presume that these roles are filled by external
hires and fail to consider the possibility that they
arise as the result of reshuffling existing people. Our
goal is to expand and add nuance to our understanding of entrepreneurial TMTs by carefully examining when and how TMTs evolve in response
to under- and overqualified management teams. A
necessary first step is to disentangle persons and
roles. Thus, we examine hiring net of adding new
roles, a TMT change we term capability reinforcement, and the addition of new roles net of hiring,
a TMT change we term structural elaboration.1
TMT underqualification: A need for change.
TMT underqualification is a deficit of functional
qualification with respect to the role structure of
the TMT, which results when there are too few managers with requisite capabilities currently in the firm
(Cappelli, 2008; Groysberg & Lee, 2009). The most
likely response to underqualification in the TMTs of
new ventures is to hire new managers who have the
needed skills (see Hambrick & Crozier, 1985). Indeed,
Cappelli (2008) argued that hiring outsiders to make
1

Although turnover studies sometimes combine TMT
hires and exits for an overall measure of compositional
change (e.g., Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005), here we focus
on hiring because it has a strong association with new
venture growth (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Gilbert,
McDougall, & Audretsch, 2006) and is more within the
control of the TMT itself. However, we control for managerial exit in our empirical models; this allows us to capture hiring that increases the skill capabilities of the TMT
beyond the hiring that may occur to fill vacancies, for
example.
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up the difference between current and desired skills
might be an effective strategy in situations with uncertain demand and short-term needs, which is consistent with those faced by new ventures.
In contrast, creating new structural roles may
not provide a viable or helpful response to underqualification in a TMT. First, adding new roles to the
TMT would add to rather than reduce capability requirements. Moreover, eliminating roles from the
structure, even ones that are not matched by the capabilities of team members, is unlikely in light of
what we know about organizational inertia and may
have broader negative implications. For example,
suppose four engineers start a new venture, yet, in
doing so, take on broad TMT roles (e.g., those including general management, business development, etc.). Altering the role structure to reflect their
current capabilities may threaten their legitimacy by
signaling low TMT quality to potential investors.
Functional breadth in TMT role structures speeds
the process of staging an initial public offering
(Beckman & Burton, 2008) and heterogeneity in expertise is valued by venture capitalists (Franke,
Gruber, Harhoff, & Henkel, 2008), both of which argue against altering role structures to reflect actualversus-intended capability when a TMT is more
narrowly qualified than its stated roles. In such instances, we suspect that team members will take
additional time to “grow into” their roles, perhaps
through on-the-job experience or training (Bidwell &
Briscoe, 2010; Hersch, 1995), while minimizing
changes to the current role structure. Indeed, they
may even divert resources from the activities associated with role additions so they can focus on developing and making use of the somewhat limited
skills in the team. In short, TMT underqualification
should result in capability reinforcement through
the hiring of new managers but not structural elaboration through the formation of new roles.
Hypothesis 1. TMT underqualification will positively predict TMT hiring.
Hypothesis 2. TMT underqualification will negatively predict new TMT roles.
TMT overqualification: An opportunity for change.
TMT overqualification is an excess of functional
qualifications with respect to the role structures
that exist within the TMT. Such TMTs do not need
to change their composition, as they are already
fulfilling the goals implied by their formal role
structure, yet their excess qualifications present
opportunities that could be capitalized on with the
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current team. As such, we suspect that any changes
to these TMTs will come in the form of adding new
roles to the structure to reflect this unutilized expertise (Miner & Estler, 1985) rather than hiring
newcomers. Adding new roles enables the TMT to
more accurately signal the capability that exists
within the team, which may be important as the new
venture TMT attempts to attract investors (see Franke
et al., 2008) or as it makes preparations for an initial public offering (Chen et al., 2008). In addition, new roles can confer status and recognition
(Baron & Bielby, 1986; Baron & Pfeffer, 1994), which
may induce overqualified managers to stay with
a young firm.
At the same time, we expect levels of TMT hiring to
be lower when levels of TMT overqualification are
higher. Consistent with this argument, Boeker and
Wiltbank (2005) found that there was less hiring and
exit in new venture TMTs that were more functionally diverse—a phenomenon highly correlated with
having more skills in the team—even in the face
of expansion. Similarly, evidence has shown that
entrepreneurial ventures with greater functional
breadth in their TMTs bring in fewer new employees
(Dencker et al., 2009a). Therefore, TMT overqualification should result in structural elaboration through
the addition of new TMT roles but not capability reinforcement through hiring.
Hypothesis 3. TMT overqualification will negatively predict TMT hiring.
Hypothesis 4. TMT overqualification will positively predict new TMT roles.
The Moderating Effects of Firm Development
Thus far, we have argued that the gaps that result
from TMT misfit reveal needs or opportunities that
contribute to the evolution of TMTs in new ventures,
without considering what resources are available to
make these changes. An important contingency factor that may affect the relationship between TMT
misfit and TMT change, therefore, may be a new
firm’s stage of development, as indicated by whether
it has achieved developmental milestones such as
receiving venture capital financing or staging an
initial public offering (e.g., Boeker & Karichalil,
2002; Chen et al., 2008; Gompers & Lerner, 2001;
Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Rubenson & Gupta, 1996;
Wasserman, 2003, 2006). Each of these milestones
provides resources that facilitate hiring and adding
roles, such as knowledge about how to structure roles
and attract experienced top managers, the ability to
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recruit these managers, and the financial means to do
so. For example, venture capitalists not only provide
capital investments in new firms but also help recruit
senior managers through their professional contacts
(Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). While these resources
may facilitate overall hiring and role additions, they
may also intervene in the relationship between misfit
and TMT changes. Therefore, the effects of TMT
misfit on TMT hiring and role additions should be
considered with respect to the firm’s level of development (see Figure 1).
We predicted that TMT underqualification would
result in capability reinforcement through increased
hiring but not structural elaboration through the
addition of new roles. Some executive hiring may
occur even before developmental milestones bring
increased resources. For example, to help attract
venture capital financing, teams may hire newcomers to ensure they have extensive industry experience and diversity in educational backgrounds
(Franke et al., 2008). New venture TMTs also go to
great lengths to ensure that they attract prestigious
executives and directors in the year prior to an initial
public offering (Chen et al., 2008). However, because
hiring new managers often requires significant resources both in terms of financial costs and in terms
of tapping into social networks to recruit qualified
candidates, we expect that the positive effect of TMT
underqualification on hiring should be even stronger
with higher levels of firm development.
We also predicted that TMT underqualification
would negatively affect new TMT roles because
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adding new roles does not solve the problems that
underqualification presents. In fact, this response
would likely add to rather than reduce capability
requirements if new roles were added, whereas
narrowing the role structure to reflect existing capabilities may send negative signals to potential
stakeholders. Although achieving developmental
milestones might provide knowledge and financial
resources that could give new firms more flexibility
to address mismatches by changing their structures,
it does little to resolve these concerns about capabilities and legitimacy. Indeed, legitimacy continues
to be a concern for both the TMT and its investors in
firms that have passed such milestones (see Guler,
2007; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). Therefore, we expect that the relationship between TMT underqualification and the number of new roles created is
unlikely to change even after reaching developmental milestones. In short, the achievement of developmental milestones will moderate the effect of
TMT underqualification on hiring, but not that of
TMT underqualification on new TMT roles.
Hypothesis 5. The positive effect of TMT underqualification on TMT hiring will depend on firm
development, such that the effect will be stronger
with greater development.
Recall that, in situations of TMT overqualification,
we expect to see an increase of new TMT roles and
a decrease of new TMT hires. Overqualified TMTs
may want to add roles to capitalize on opportunities
created by overqualification, but doing so can be

FIGURE 1
TMT Misfit and Firm Development as Predictors of New Venture TMT Evolution
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a significant and costly undertaking (Stinchcombe,
1965), requiring managerial time, expertise, and coordination (Sine et al., 2006). Overqualified TMTs
will have some surplus capabilities that might be
applied to developing new roles; however, the resources gained by achieving developmental milestones can further facilitate role additions. The
influx of cash and expertise may afford managers
more time and financial resources to make adjustments in the structure, and investors themselves may
provide expert coaching (see Baum & Silverman,
2004; Hellmann, 2000) to help them more appropriately signal their quality through improving and
developing the role structure. Thus, the positive effect of TMT overqualification on new roles should be
even stronger at higher levels of firm development.
We also argued that TMT overqualification would
dampen hiring since the qualifications of current TMT
members already fulfill stated goals and anticipated
needs could potentially be filled with these existing
surplus capabilities. Overqualification creates neither
a need nor an opportunity to hire, and thus the effect
of TMT overqualification on hiring should be independent of the increased resources associated with
achieving developmental milestones. So, while the
resources that come with achieving developmental
milestones may themselves result in greater hiring
(Davila, Foster, & Gupta, 2003), these additional resources would be unrelated to the effect of TMT
overqualification on hiring. In sum, we expect that the
achievement of developmental milestones will moderate the effect of TMT overqualification on new TMT
roles, but not that of TMT overqualification on hiring.
Hypothesis 6. The positive effect of TMT overqualification on new TMT roles will depend on
firm development, such that the effect will be
stronger with greater development.
METHODS
Data and Sample
We test these ideas by examining a sample of 167
high-technology entrepreneurial firms in a single
region that have been studied previously (Baron,
Hannan, & Burton, 1999, 2001; Burton, Sørensen, &
Beckman, 2002). Previous studies collected TMT
data on these firms and examined important elements of entrepreneurship theory, such as team
factors that lead to venture capital financing or initial
public offering (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Beckman
et al., 2007) and factors that result in different strategic choices (Beckman, 2006). The current study is
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designed to examine the evolution of the people and
role structures that comprise the TMT in these entrepreneurial firms. Building from past studies that
document path dependence in TMT composition
and structure (Beckman & Burton, 2008) and position
imprinting of individual roles (Burton & Beckman,
2007), the present study is an attempt to better understand the mechanisms of imprinting and path dependence at the team level. We extend ideas from the
fit literature and consider how types of misfit between
all TMT roles and the people that occupy those roles
drive subsequent changes to TMT composition and
structure.
The firms in the sample were less than 10 years old
and had fewer than 10 employees when they were
initially contacted. This database contains rich information about the roles in the TMT and the managers who occupy them, as well as information about
the developmental milestones achieved by each firm
(e.g., dates of venture capital funding and initial
public offering). Information about the roles and
managers included in the TMTs was gathered via
interviews, internal company documents, public
archives, and extensive Web searches. As described
in Burton and Beckman (2007), the research team
tracked the career histories, start dates, initial job
titles, job title changes, and departure dates of each
executive who ever held a TMT position of vice
president (VP) or higher in one of the sampled
firms from firm founding to December 2000 or
until acquisition or failure. The database contains
information on 1,452 executives holding 1,918
TMT roles.
Measures
Independent variables. Based on our conceptualization of TMT misfit, we needed a measure that
could (a) assess misfit across the entire management
team, rather than as an aggregation of individuallevel misfit; (b) capture both overqualification and
underqualification instead of one combined measure; and (c) be assessed on a set of objective qualifications that could be observed in both roles and
managers. TMT misfit was calculated by comparing
the number of times each functional area was listed
in any job title for the entire top team with the total
number of managers with experience in those functional areas.
First, both current job titles and the career histories
of top managers at the hierarchical level of VP or
above were classified according to 11 different
functional areas: sales, marketing, customer support,
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operations, finance, administration, human resources,
strategic planning/business development, science/
engineering, information systems, and general management (Burton & Beckman, 2007). For example, one
of the TMTs in our sample included the following
job titles (and functional classifications): president/
chief executive officer (general management), VP
of engineering (science/engineering), VP of international operations (operations), chief financial officer
(finance), VP of manufacturing (operations), and VP of
marketing (marketing). This team thus had one general management role, one science/engineering role,
one finance role, one marketing role, and two operations roles.
Next, the career histories of the top managers were
also classified according to these 11 functional areas.
Executives were considered to have experience in
these areas if they had titles that included these
functions in any of their previous three jobs. One
manager in our sample was recruited from a competitor to replace the VP of marketing. The new hire
had served for four years first as strategic marketing
manager and later as marketing director for a business unit. His prior position had been systems engineer at a different firm. We would code this person
as having prior experience in both marketing and
engineering.
Using these data, we then calculated the amount of
overqualification or underqualification relative to
the current role structure at the team level. TMT
overqualification is a count of the prior experiences
above that required by the current roles of the team
across all 11 functions. For example, if there are three
top managers who have operations experience but
only two current job titles that indicate an operations
functional role (e.g., the VP of international operations and the VP of manufacturing in the sample
TMT described above), the TMT would have an
overqualification score of 1 for the operations function. Overqualification was then summed across all
11 functional areas to give an overall measure of how
much more experience the group of top managers
had relative to the current roles listed for the team
(mean 5 2.45, SD 5 2.27, range 5 0 to 18).
TMT underqualification is a count of the roles
listed for the TMT that include functional areas for
which the group of top managers lack prior experience. For instance, a firm that has three roles with
marketing listed in its TMT titles but only two top
managers with marketing experience would have
an underqualification score of 1 for the marketing
function. Underqualification was summed across
the 11 functions to indicate how much the group of
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top managers lacked experience relative to the current roles listed for the TMT (mean 5 0.47, SD 5 0.92,
range 5 0 to 9). On average, TMTs had managers with
experience in 1.84 functions (SD 5 0.90) while the
roles in the team required capabilities in 1.24 functions (SD 5 0.48). When aggregated across all positions, this produced a higher level of overqualification
than underqualification.
After executives held their current roles for one
year, a long enough time frame to learn from onthe-job experience (National Center for O*NET
Development, 2011), they were considered to have
experience in that function (i.e., had they not otherwise had prior experience in their career history).
Other specifications of the extent to which executives learn on the job were examined as robustness
checks. Finally, we lagged the TMT misfit variables
by 12 months, t 2 12, in order to allow the effects of
overqualification and underqualification on changes
to TMT composition and structure to be realized
within the firms over the following year.
Both the TMT overqualification and TMT underqualification measures assess the fit between the
work deemed important by the TMT (e.g., as listed by
TMT roles) and the ability of the team to carry out
that work (e.g., as assessed by the total amount of
prior functional experiences across all top managers
in those roles). The assumption of this measure is
that the prior functional experience of one manager
may be helpful to another manager who holds a different role. However, it is possible that top managers
will not use their skills to fill in voids in other areas
within the TMT. Therefore, we constructed an alternative measure of TMT misfit as a robustness
check. For this alternative measure, we considered
the match between current job title and prior functional experience for each individual manager before
aggregating these scores to the team level, as in an
additive composition model (Chan, 1998). For example, in our sample TMT described above, there
may be one individual who has experience beyond
that required by his or her role (e.g., the chief operating officer has experience in both general management and marketing) and one individual who
lacks experience required by his or her role (e.g., the
VP of marketing has business development experience but not marketing experience). Assuming all
other individuals on the TMT have experience
commensurate with their roles, this TMT would
have an overqualification score of 1 (i.e., the chief
operating officer) and an underqualification score of
1 (i.e., VP of marketing). Thus, unlike the team-level
measure in which the chief operating officer’s
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marketing experience would “count” for the role of
VP of marketing, this measure considers the underqualification of the VP of marketing without respect
to the prior functional experience of any other
member of the team. These measures are slightly
larger in magnitude for both types of misfit, and assume that individuals’ experiences are not utilized
beyond their specific roles. We report the results
using this measure in the robustness checks section
for comparison purposes.
Next, we assessed firm development by examining
whether a firm had received venture capital funding
or staged an initial public offering. Both of these
events are considered to be important developmental milestones (e.g., Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; Chen
et al., 2008; Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Rubenson &
Gupta, 1996; Wasserman, 2003) and each represents
the receipt of additional resources that are brought
into the new venture, in terms of financial capital
and expertise (Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Hellmann &
Puri, 2002; Wasserman, 2003). Therefore, we dummy
coded the firm’s achievement of each of these two
milestones at time t, and then summed across events
to create an overall measure of level of firm development. This variable ranged from 0, in which a firm
had no venture capital funding and no initial public
offering, to 2, in which a firm had received venture
capital funding and had staged an initial public offering. In our sample, 71% of the firms received
venture capital funding and 53% went public.
These numbers are high relative to start-ups in the
general population of start-ups, but our sample
consists of high-technology firms in the 1990s, a
period of incredible growth for entrepreneurial companies in the United States.
Dependent variables. Changes to the TMT in response to the needs or opportunities reflected in
TMT misfit could come in the form of hiring new
managers and/or adding new structural roles. Hiring
new managers expands the TMT in terms of numbers
of managers and, more importantly for our arguments, in terms of capabilities. Since hiring may also
occur as new roles are created, we examine the hiring
of new managers into the TMT while holding the
TMT structure constant. The second type of change,
adding new roles, is an elaboration of structure. New
roles involve the addition of distinct tasks not previously identified in the role structure. We are particularly interested in the phenomenon of broadening
the role structure within which current managers
operate. For example, a current manager may take on
a new role of VP of business development, which
had never before existed in the firm, and his or her
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previous role (e.g., VP of sales and marketing) might be
filled by another manager, altogether eliminated, or
split into roles for other managers. Since new roles
could also be filled by hiring new managers (e.g., a
newcomer takes on a new role of VP of business development) (see Levesque, 2005; Miner, 1987), we
examine the addition of new roles to the TMT holding
TMT hiring constant.
First, we calculated TMT hiring as the sum of all
top managers who appeared in month t but who were
not employed by the firm in month t 2 1. This dependent variable comprises the number of hires in
the TMT over a one-year period; that is, TMT hiring
measured at time t is the sum of the new hires within
the TMT over the subsequent 12 months (t 1 12).
However, this variable is updated each month to reflect hiring at different times in the prior year. This
allowed us to capture hiring in a fine-grained way,
such that the misfit variables are predicting 12
months of hiring exactly one year after assessing
TMT misfit. In contrast, yearly analysis could introduce greater variability in these time spans; for
example, examining misfit that occurred in January
of one year with hiring that occurred in November
of the following year, even though the time span is
greater than 12 months. Monthly updating thus
captures the dynamic changes through hiring observed in these firms within the 12-month period for
which they are counted and allows us to be more
precise with respect to the time spans between independent and dependent variables.
Next, we assessed new TMT roles as being added
when a job title appeared that had never before
existed in the firm (see Cohen & Broschak, 2013). For
example, the addition of a VP of sales title that had
never before existed would be counted as a new TMT
role. However, if the firm later added titles such as
executive VP of sales, VP of North American sales, or
VP of sales and marketing, these would not be considered to be new TMT roles as they are variations on
a previously existing role. In addition, splitting an
existing role (e.g., splitting a previously existing role
of VP of sales and marketing into VP of sales and VP
of marketing) would not be considered a new role in
our terminology as the need for the functional expertise had already been formally articulated. None
of the titles that existed during the founding month of
the firm were coded as new, since, prior to that date,
the firm did not exist. Finally, we did not include
“founder” as a job title in our coding scheme as this
title does not imply a structural role or responsibility
within the TMT; rather, it indicates an individual’s
status or past history with the firm. The first author
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coded the job titles that existed within the firms
based on the above coding scheme. A second coder
applied the coding scheme to half of the dataset in
order to verify that the coding scheme was applied
consistently and reliably. Agreement between the
two coders was acceptable (Cohen’s k 5 .87), so we
were confident in using this coding scheme to assess
new TMT roles. There were 1,918 job titles in the
dataset, of which 40% were considered new roles, in
that no portion of the job title existed in the prior
periods. Like TMT hiring, new TMT roles were
counted over a one-year period for the analysis, but
updated monthly to reflect the fine-grained changes
in TMT structure that occurred over that period.
Control variables. We controlled for industry
to account for potential differences in opportunity
structures for firms within particular industries.
For example, manufacturing has lower turnover
rates than high-technology firms in general (Burton &
Beckman, 2007) and may also experience more stability in roles. In our analyses, we found that different industries matter for TMT hires and role
additions, so we included five dummy variables to
account for variations among firms in all six industries. Firm age has been shown to relate to role
structure (Baron, Burton, & Hannan, 1999), so we
controlled for firm age as measured by the number
of months since founding. Firm age was lagged by
12 months to match our misfit variables.
Size can affect potential for growth via new hires
and proliferation of new job titles (Baron & Bielby,
1986; Strang & Baron, 1990), and team size may be
particularly relevant for entrepreneurial firms (Burton
& Beckman, 2007; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990).
Therefore, we control for team size as the number
of executives in the TMT. Evidence suggests that it
is important to control for organizational tenure
(Cohen & Broschak, 2013), which we measured as
both the mean tenure among a firm’s TMT and the
standard deviation of tenure among top managers.
Finally, because the level of functional diversity in
a team may also influence whether positions or
people are altered, we controlled for the functional
diversity of the team by calculating Blau’s (1977)
index for functional diversity for the executives’
three most recent job titles. Team size, average tenure
and tenure dispersion, and functional diversity were
also lagged by 12 months.
Next, we controlled for TMT exits, which could
affect the amount of hiring and the addition of new
roles in the current structure, by calculating the total
number of top managers who were employed by the
firm in month t 2 1 but not employed by the firm in
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month t. Similar to the dependent variables described above, exits were considered over a one-year
period for the analysis but updated monthly to reflect
the dynamic changes occurring in the composition
of the TMT over that period.
Finally, in order to capture distinct changes to the
TMT in terms of hiring or roles, it is necessary to
control for the other potential dependent variable
when estimating the effects of misfit on either of the
changes to the TMT. For example, we have argued
that TMT overqualification should result in the elaboration of structure through addition of new TMT
roles for existing top managers. Any role changes
should be over and above those that occur when
hiring newcomers to fill new roles. Thus, when
estimating the effects of TMT misfit on new TMT
roles, it is essential to control for TMT hiring in the
same period. Similarly, we control for new TMT
roles when estimating the effects of TMT misfit on
TMT hiring, which captures the reinforcement of capabilities while keeping the role structure constant.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics and correlations among study
variables are presented in Table 1. Of note is the
high amount of overqualification (mean 5 2.45,
SD 5 2.27) relative to underqualification (mean 5
0.47, SD 5 0.92) in these teams. Moreover, there is
a small positive correlation between over- and
underqualification (r 5 .05), which indicates that
these are independent types of misfit. Given relatively high correlations between some of our independent variables and control variables (e.g.,
TMT overqualification and functional diversity),
we checked for the possibility of multicollinearity.
First, we analyzed variance inflation factors, which
revealed that no variables had scores higher than 10
(the highest score was 4.17) (Hair, Anderson, Tatham,
& Black, 1995; Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1996).
Next, we ran our models without each of the control
variables that had high correlations with the independent variables (e.g., functional diversity, team size),
and the exclusion of these controls yielded results
consistent with those presented below. Not surprisingly, TMT hiring and new TMT roles are highly correlated, because hiring often occurs with the addition
of new roles. Again, our focus here is on capability
reinforcement through TMT hiring while controlling
for structural elaboration through adding new roles
and vice versa.
To estimate the effects of TMT misfit on composition and structure, we performed monthly
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panel-Poisson random effects regression analyses
predicting counts of the number of new TMT hires
and new TMT roles with estimates grouped by firm (see
Table 2). Poisson models are superior to ordinary least
squares regression when estimating count data because the distribution of the data are typically skewed
(Allison, 2009), and are a standard approach for
analyzing panel count data in particular (Somaya,
Williamson, & Lorinkova, 2008).
Hypothesis 1 and 2 suggested that TMT underqualification would positively predict new TMT
hires and negatively predict new TMT roles. Models
1 and 4 are our baseline models with only control
variables. Models 2 and 5 add the main effects of
TMT underqualification on new TMT hires and
roles, revealing that TMT underqualification positively predicts the number of hires and negatively
predicts adding roles, supporting these hypotheses.
The practical significance of these findings is illuminated by the incident rate ratios from these models,
which suggest that, for every unit increase in TMT
underqualification, there is a 7% increase in the incident rate of the number of new TMT hires and
a 12% decrease in the incident rate of the number of
new TMT roles. Considering these effects over
time, an average firm, with the mean level of TMT
underqualification, takes approximately 2.6 years
to hire a newcomer and approximately 1.9 years to
add an additional role. In contrast, firms with high
levels of TMT underqualification (i.e., two standard deviations above the mean) hire a newcomer
about 4 months sooner but wait about 6 months
longer to add a new role.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 suggested that TMT overqualification would negatively predict TMT hiring and
positively predict new TMT roles. Models 2 and 5
show the main effects for TMT overqualification
on new TMT hires and roles, revealing that TMT
overqualification negatively predicts the number of
hires and positively predicts adding roles, supporting
both hypotheses. Note that the coefficients for TMT
overqualification predicting hires and roles are smaller
than those of TMT underqualification, a point we explore further with our robustness checks. Practically,
for every unit increase in TMT overqualification there
is a 3% decrease in the incident rate of the number of
new TMT hires and a 3% increase in the incident rate
of the number of new TMT roles. Considering these
effects over time, an average firm, with the mean level
of TMT overqualification, takes approximately 2.6
years to hire a newcomer and approximately 1.9 years
to add an additional role. In contrast, firms with high
levels of TMT overqualification wait about 5 months
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TABLE 2
Results of Panel–Poisson Regression Analysis for TMT Hiring and New TMT Rolesa
TMT Hiring
Variables

Model 1

Computer industry
Manufacturing industry
Medical industry
Research industry
Semiconductor industry
Firm ageb
Team sizeb
Team tenureb
Team tenure (SD) b
Blau’s indexb
TMT exits
TMT hiring
New TMT Roles

20.13
(0.18)
21.81***
(0.39)
20.13
(0.23)
22.37***
(0.54)
20.10
(0.25)
20.01***
(0.00)
0.02***
(0.01)
20.00
(0.00)
0.02***
(0.00)
0.22***
(0.06)
0.20***
(0.01)
—

20.13
(0.18)
21.84***
(0.40)
20.13
(0.23)
22.41***
(0.54)
20.08
(0.25)
20.01***
(0.00)
0.02***
(0.01)
20.00
(0.00)
0.01***
(0.00)
0.19**
(0.07)
0.21***
(0.01)
—

0.58***
(0.01)

0.58***
(0.01)
0.16***
(0.03)
0.07***
(0.01)
20.03***
(0.01)

0.58***
(0.01)
0.08*
(0.03)
20.07***
(0.02)
20.02**
(0.01)
0.11***
(0.01)
—

TMT underqualificationb
TMT overqualificationb

Wald x2
Log likelihood
Likelihood-ratio test
Observations
Number of firms
a

20.81***
(0.15)
6065.91***
214088.77
17,659
167

Standard errors in parentheses.
Lagged by 12 months.
***p , .001
**p , .01
*p , .05
†
p , .10
b

Model 3

20.15
(0.18)
21.91***
(0.40)
20.07
(0.23)
22.48***
(0.54)
20.08
(0.25)
20.01***
(0.00)
0.02***
(0.00)
20.00*
(0.00)
0.02***
(0.00)
0.15*
(0.06)
0.19***
(0.01)
—

Firm development

TMT underqualificationb 3
Firm development
TMT overqualificationb 3 Firm
development
Constant

Model 2

New TMT Roles

20.99***
(0.15)
6115.83***
214039.42
98.70***
17,659
167

20.87***
(0.16)
6138.58***
213999.09
80.65***
17,659
167

Model 4
20.29
(0.18)
21.87***
(0.40)
0.17
(0.23)
24.39***
(0.84)
20.05
(0.25)
20.01***
(0.00)
20.00
(0.01)
0.01***
(0.00)
20.00
(0.00)
0.08
(0.07)
20.12***
(0.01)
0.51***
(0.01)
—

20.93***
(0.15)
4464.54***
211868.08
17,659
167

Model 5

Model 6

20.31†
(0.17)
21.73***
(0.39)
0.11
(0.22)
24.20***
(0.84)
20.03
(0.25)
20.01***
(0.00)
20.01
(0.01)
0.00†
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
20.11
(0.08)
20.14***
(0.01)
0.51***
(0.01)
—

20.31†
(0.17)
21.80***
(0.39)
0.13
(0.23)
24.23***
(0.84)
20.02
(0.25)
20.01***
(0.00)
20.01
(0.01)
0.00*
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
20.03
(0.08)
20.14***
(0.01)
0.51***
(0.01)
—

0.10**
(0.03)
20.13***
(0.01)
0.03***
(0.01)

0.04
(0.04)
20.13***
(0.01)
20.01
(0.02)
—

20.78***
(0.15)
4619.61***
211804.53
127.10***
17,659
167

0.03*
(0.01)
20.75***
(0.15)
4627.85***
211801.76
5.55*
17,659
167
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longer to hire a newcomer, but add a new role about
3 months sooner.
Hypothesis 5 suggested that firm development
moderates the effect of TMT underqualification on
TMT hiring. Model 3 shows that the coefficient on
this interaction term is positive, indicating that the
slope of the effect of TMT underqualification on the
number of new TMT hires becomes more positive as
firm development increases. Figure 2 shows the effect of TMT underqualification on the expected
number of new TMT hires for each number of developmental milestones the firm has achieved. Using
a procedure described by Dawson (2014) to evaluate simple slopes for interactions with nonlinear
models, we discovered that, when firms have not
achieved any developmental milestones, the effect
of TMT underqualification on new TMT hires is
negative (b 5 2.07, p 5 .00). When the number of
milestones equals one or two, the effect is positive
(b 5 .04, p 5 .00; b 5 .15, p 5 .00). This supports
Hypothesis 5.
Practically, the expected number of new TMT
hires increases with greater TMT underqualification
and the achievement of more milestones, and, when
firms have not achieved any milestones, they are not
likely to hire as a result of underqualification. This
latter effect suggests that the support for Hypothesis
1 is driven by those firms that have reached developmental milestones. For example, at mean levels
of TMT underqualification, new ventures that have
not achieved any milestones are expected to hire
a newcomer in approximately 3.1 years, whereas
new ventures that have achieved two developmental
milestones hire about 9 months sooner. At high
levels of TMT underqualification (i.e., two standard
deviations above the mean), new ventures that have
not achieved any milestones are expected to hire
a newcomer in approximately 3.6 years, whereas
new ventures that have achieved two milestones hire
about 1.8 years sooner.
Hypothesis 6 suggested that firm development
moderates the relationship between TMT overqualification and new TMT roles. Model 6 reveals
that the coefficient on the interaction term is positive
and significant, indicating that the slope of the effect
of TMT overqualification on the number of new
roles becomes more positive as firms pass more developmental milestones. Figure 3 shows the effects
of TMT overqualification on the expected number of
new TMT roles added for each number of developmental milestones achieved. Simple slope
analysis shows that the relationship between TMT
overqualification and new TMT roles is negative
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when the number of developmental milestones
equals zero (b 5 2.02, p 5 .00). However, this relationship is not significant when the firm has
achieved one developmental milestone (b 5 .01, p 5
.28). Further, this relationship is positive when the
firm has achieved two developmental milestones
(b 5 .04, p 5 .00). These results are consistent with
Hypothesis 6.
Practically, the expected number of new TMT
roles increases with greater TMT overqualification
and the achievement of both venture capital financing and initial public offering, and, when firms
have not achieved either of these milestones, they
are not likely to create new roles as a result of overqualification. This latter effect suggests that the
support for Hypothesis 4 is driven by those firms that
have reached developmental milestones. For example, at mean levels of TMT overqualification, new
ventures that have not achieved any milestones are
expected to add a new TMT role in approximately
4.4 years, whereas new ventures that have achieved
two developmental milestones add a new role about
10 months sooner. At high levels of TMT overqualification, new ventures that have not achieved
any milestones are expected to add a new TMT role
in 4.8 years, whereas new ventures that have achieved
two developmental milestones add a new role about
1.8 years sooner.
Robustness Checks
We performed a number of additional analyses to
verify the robustness of our results. First, to understand how long misfit affects our outcomes, we
tested alternative lag structures for the TMT misfit
and control variables: an 18-month lag for TMT
misfit, to predict changes to TMT hiring and roles in
the following 18 months, and a 24-month lag for TMT
misfit, predicting changes to TMT hiring and roles
over the following 24 months. Our results remain
consistent with these lags, with two exceptions.
First, when we adopt the 18-month lag structure, the
interaction effect of TMT overqualification and firm
development on new TMT roles in Model 6 is not
significant (b 5 2.01, p 5 .19) Second, when we
adopt either of these longer lag structures, the positive main effect of TMT overqualification on new
TMT roles in Model 5 is no longer significant. Again,
however, this main effect is qualified by the significant interaction between TMT overqualification and
firm development on the number of new TMT roles
in the 24-month lag model, which is consistent with
our results as currently presented.
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FIGURE 2
The Effects of TMT Underqualification and Firm Development on Predicted Number of New TMT Hires
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To consider the possibility that some hiring and
role additions may be created in anticipation of an
upcoming milestone, as “window dressing,” we also
adopted a different event window with respect to
our firm development variable. Specifically, we
created a variable called “milestone anticipation”
that equaled one for the 12-month period prior to the
receipt of venture capital financing or initial public
offering (i.e., the 12-month period prior to the point
at which our firm development variable became one
instead of zero). We found that this variable was
negatively related to hiring (b 5 2.20, p 5 .01) and
new TMT roles (b 5 2.26, p 5 .00), indicating that
firms were less likely to hire or add roles in the year
prior to achieving a developmental milestone than at
other times. Moreover, including the milestone anticipation variable along with the firm development
variable in our current models did not change any of
the signs or significance levels for the hypothesized
results reported in Table 2. This suggests that, while
firms may engage in other forms of window dressing
in anticipation of a financing event, such as adding
executives or directors with specific prestige (Chen
et al., 2008), they do not substantially alter the roles

Development = 2

or composition of the TMT more generally. This is
consistent with our finding that firms need resources
to make changes to the TMT.
Second, we considered several alternative specifications of our TMT misfit variables. Because misfit
is not typically conceptualized at a collective team
level, we first considered an alternative measure that
treated misfit as position specific to account for the
idea that the excess qualifications of one manager
may not benefit those in another role. The pattern of
results was identical with respect to the signs and
significance levels of the coefficients for our predictor variables. We also considered the possibility
that on-the-job training for executives might take
longer than one year when updating the functional
experience calculations for our misfit variables.
Therefore, we adopted a three-year on-the-job training rule of thumb (see Conger & Nadler, 2012), which
resulted in similar results with the exception that the
interaction between TMT overqualification and firm
development on new TMT roles becomes insignificant (b 5 .01, p 5 .49). Finally, we considered the
possibility that calculating functional experience
based on the past three positions may overemphasize
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FIGURE 3
The Effects of TMT Overqualification and Firm Development on Predicted Number of New TMT Roles
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distant past experience. As such, we calculated
functional experience using three alternatives: the
most recent position only, the past three executivelevel positions (vs. including experience gained in
non-executive positions), and the most recent executivelevel position only. Across all of the models using
the TMT misfit variables calculated under these
alternative assumptions, we found that the signs
and significance levels of the coefficients for our
predictor variables remain unchanged from those
presented in Table 2.
Next, we ran Models 3 and 6 with the addition of
the interaction terms that we did not hypothesize
a priori. Specifically, we included the interaction
between TMT overqualification and firm development when predicting new TMT hires and the interaction between TMT underqualification and firm
development when predicting new TMT roles. Neither of these interactions was statistically significant,
and their inclusion in the models did not change
the sign or significance levels of the hypothesized
effects.
Finally, we examined two alternative model
specifications. First, we estimated fixed effects

Development = 2

panel-Poisson models to further take into account
time-invariant characteristics of firms. The results
are consistent with the random effects models
presented in Table 2, both in terms of the signs and
significance levels of the coefficients of the predictor variables. Second, we considered the possibility of excess zeros in the dependent variables.
Because we have panel data, we could not use zeroinflated Poisson. Instead, we ran two-stage Poisson
random effect hurdle models to predict the excess
zeros and then the count of new TMT roles and
hires (see Min & Agresti, 2005). First, we recoded
these dependent variables into dummy variables
and ran a panel-logit model to simulate running
the first part of a zero-inflated Poisson inflate
model. Next, we ran panel-Poisson models for the
counts of the dependent variables when they were
equal to one or above. After taking into account the
excess zeros in the panel-logit model, the panelPoisson count models for dependent variables at
one or above were largely consistent with the panelPoisson count models that include zero counts
reported in Table 2. For example, they showed
that TMT overqualification negatively predicts the
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number of new TMT hires (at p 5 .06) and TMT
underqualification positively predicts the number
of new TMTs hires, although the latter main effect
continues to be qualified by a positive interaction
term for TMT underqualification and firm development. In addition, TMT overqualification positively predicts the number of new TMT roles (at p 5
.05) and TMT underqualification negatively predicts the number of new TMT roles. However, the
interaction term between TMT overqualification
and firm development is no longer significant,
which is inconsistent with Hypothesis 6.
In summary, these alternative models indicate that
our results are generally robust across a variety of
model specifications, variable operationalizations,
and variable lag structures. The exception is the interactive effect of TMT overqualification and firm
development on new TMT roles, which was not
supported in three robustness checks. Moreover, the
coefficients of TMT overqualification were smaller
than those of TMT underqualification. One explanation for these results is that the opportunity afforded by overqualification is less of a driver of change
than the need indicated by underqualification. To
explore this empirically, we performed dominance
analysis using the domin package in Stata (Luchman,
2013), which examines the relative importance of
two predictor variables for every possible subset of
the full model in which only one of the two predictors is entered (Azen & Budescu, 2003). The general and conditional dominance statistics showed
that TMT underqualification reduced the Akaike
information criterion fit statistic by a greater amount
than did TMT overqualification, suggesting it is the
more critical predictor of TMT changes.
DISCUSSION
We began this paper by noting the balancing act
that new venture TMTs perform between fulfilling
immediate needs and capitalizing on opportunities in a context in which resources are in short
supply, and we examined this balancing act for the
composition and structure of the TMT itself. We
theorized that TMT misfit, defined as discrepancies
between the qualifications of TMT managers and
the functional roles they fill, would influence hiring
and the addition of new roles to the TMT, and that
these relationships may be contingent upon the resources new firms gain by achieving developmental
milestones.
We found that TMT misfit in the form of underqualification resulted in increased hiring of newcomers
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but not the addition of roles, whereas TMT misfit in the
form of overqualification resulted in the addition of
roles but not increased hiring of newcomers. However,
firm development was an important determinant of
whether TMT misfit resulted in such changes at all.
Prior to achieving developmental milestones, firms
made few TMT changes in response to misfit. Only after
passing developmental milestones did overqualified
TMTs elaborate their structures by adding new roles
and underqualified TMTs reinforce their capabilities
by hiring new people.
We also found that TMT underqualification was
a more robust predictor of TMT change than TMT
overqualification. TMT underqualification occurs
when a team has fewer capabilities than those identified in the formal role structure, and, as such, represents an underlying need to add skills to achieve
its implied goals. Teams characterized by overqualification, in contrast, are currently fulfilling the
implied goals of their role structure and have excess
capabilities. These teams do not have an underlying
need, but, rather, an opportunity to better recognize
and profit from the capabilities of their members. As
such, the effects of TMT misfit appear to be asymmetrical: the need presented by underqualification
may trump the opportunity presented by overqualification when predicting TMT evolution.
These findings contribute to theories of entrepreneurial firms in several ways. First, by modeling the
misfit between TMT composition and structure in
new ventures, we demonstrate that it is insufficient
and possibly misleading to treat composition and
structure as interchangeable or to look at one independently of the other. While a small set of studies
has examined the effects of one or the other in
explaining new venture TMT evolution, ours is the
first to consider TMT misfit, the intersection of the
two, in explaining how new venture TMTs evolve.
Second, in examining this interplay between
misfit and new venture development, we reveal an
important professionalization paradox in the evolution of new venture TMTs: firms seem unable to
reach the level of professionalization needed to attract resources without first having obtained those
resources. Specifically, new venture TMTs often experience mismatches between the composite experiences of their top managers and the roles that
they occupy, and, as such, may need to change
roles or people to reach developmental milestones.
However, their ability to make such changes may
be constrained until they can obtain the financial
and social capital resources that the achievement
of developmental milestones provides and which

2016

Ferguson, Cohen, Burton, and Beckman

facilitate further change. This professionalization
paradox may offer an additional explanation of why
it is rare for entrepreneurial firms to ever reach these
milestones and more generally to succeed. Our
finding on the lack of window dressing in the form of
adding roles or members in advance of resource
milestones further highlights this paradox. Unlike
research on other forms of window dressing (Chen
et al., 2008), our sample includes firms that never get
venture capital or go public, and our findings thus
raise questions about whether window dressing is
a strategy that firms follow or is an artifact of sampling successful firms. Once a firm obtains resources,
this facilitates team changes (see also Boeker &
Wiltbank, 2005), but not all firms are able to obtain
resources. Our examination of how developmental
milestones interact with TMT overqualification and
underqualification to influence TMT evolution thus
harkens back to an earlier tradition of research that
emphasized organizational life stages (e.g., Greiner,
1972), which established that processes can and
do operate differently at different stages in a firm’s
development.
Further contributions to the entrepreneurship literature include our findings that over- and underqualification have asymmetrical effects on TMT
evolution. Many entrepreneurial studies point to the
importance of the quality of the top managers for new
venture success (e.g., Burton et al., 2002; Franke
et al., 2008; Hsu, 2007). Our study suggests, however,
that overqualified TMTs may fail to take advantage of
the opportunities their excess capabilities afford. For
example, because firms do not explicitly signal their
full capabilities through the role structure, investors
may underestimate the value of that new venture.
Not being able to attract those resources, in turn, may
make it difficult to respond to that misfit.
Next, our study goes beyond previous entrepreneurship studies of growth in the TMT capabilities of entrepreneurial firms that count the overall
size of the team. Rather, there are different ways to
expand—by adding people or by adding roles—and
the two have differing implications for new ventures.
Thus, we differentiate whether adding team members is associated with adding breadth to the TMT in
the form of structural elaboration, or whether it is the
result of adding capacity to areas of established expertise by hiring additional senior managers. Our
results suggest that simply adding more managers to
the count may have unintended negative consequences when those managers do not have the right
skills: adding excess skills may make future hiring
less likely. Nor would it be accurate to treat the
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addition of a new person into a new role as identical
to the addition of a new person into an existing role.
Manager counts must be considered in the context
of TMT structural needs. Moreover, conceptually
distinguishing structural elaboration and capability
reinforcement as alternative approaches to TMT
growth and professionalization points to avenues for
future research and provides an overarching framework for understanding the literature that has examined the emergence, diffusion, and performance
implications of specific TMT roles such as the chief
operating officer, chief financial officer, or VP of
human resources (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004;
Welbourne & Cyr, 1999; Zorn, 2004).
Beyond informing literature on entrepreneurship,
these results contribute more generally to research
on upper echelons. While upper echelons scholars
recognize that there are costs to mismatches between
the experiences of top executives and structures in
which they work (e.g., Burton & Beckman, 2007;
Chen & Hambrick, 2012), to date there has been very
little attention paid to the phenomenon of misfit at
the level of the TMT. This study examines a setting in
which misfit is likely to occur in top teams (i.e., new
ventures), and shows that misfit acts both as a catalyst to change and a source of inertia in TMT structure and composition. It ultimately answers calls
to more fully explain the characteristics of TMTs
(Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Hambrick,
2007) by examining these types of teams in their
early stages.
In addition, we contribute to theories of role change.
Though there is substantial evidence of inertia in
various aspects of organizational and role structures, even in entrepreneurial organizations (e.g., Baron
et al., 2001; Beckman & Burton, 2008; Burton &
Beckman, 2007), it is also evident that these structures must and do change over time. However, we
know relatively little about how and why those role
structure changes happen (Cohen, 2013). When
previous research has explored change in roles, it is
most often as a response to individual motivations
(e.g., Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001) or external
pressures (e.g., Zorn, 2004). However, we find that
structural role elaboration also results from an internal structural team factor, TMT overqualification,
in which top managers have functional experiences
beyond those required by the roles within the TMT.
Finally, we build on the person–job misfit literature with two methodological shifts. Instead of focusing
on individual responses to misfit (e.g., dissatisfaction
and turnover) (Kalleberg, 2008; Kristof-Brown et al.,
2005), we explore how misfit at a team level influences
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changes to team composition and team structure. As
such, this study contributes to a growing body of literature on team-level conceptualizations of fit (e.g.,
DeRue & Hollenbeck, 2007; Seong & Choi, 2014). We
also investigate two distinct forms of misfit: overqualification and underqualification. Person–job
misfit literature has generally not distinguished
between these (Erdogan et al., 2011); however, doing so allows us to be more precise in explaining
how misfit alters role structures and people within
the TMT.
Limitations and Future Directions
While this paper makes several unique contributions, it has some limitations. First, it is difficult to
know from this study whether the net effects of misfit
are good or bad for the firm and its top managers. For
instance, the addition of new roles can be seen as
a form of individual reward (Baron & Bielby, 1986;
Baron & Pfeffer, 1994) and as a way of taking advantage of unforeseen organizational opportunities
(Miner, 1987; Miner & Estler, 1985), but is also an
additional form of turbulence for already-turbulent
new ventures. Similarly, hiring may bring additional
capabilities and resources such as prestige into new
firms, but the costliness and potential impermanence of some hires may not translate into long-term
gains in these areas (Chen et al., 2008). Future studies
should thus incorporate measures of firm performance to better understand whether changes to the
TMT as a result of misfit are ultimately beneficial or
detrimental as new ventures develop.
Next, though we observe patterns of change in
TMTs due to misfit, it is unclear whether these
changes to people and roles are intentional strategies
on the part of top managers or more serendipitous
processes. For example, elaborating the TMT structure by adding new roles can be due to a deliberate
effort to recruit or retain specific individuals, or it
can evolve more organically around perceptions
of managerial expertise (Bunderson & Sutcliffe,
2002; Miner, 1987). The results of this study reveal
the overarching effects of misfit on changes to the
TMT, but do not isolate the influence of the different mechanisms that explain these effects (e.g.,
need vs. opportunity vs. resources). Therefore, future studies might assess top managers’ perceptions of TMT misfit to better understand whether
they are recognizing and responding to misfit or
whether these changes are occurring in lieu of
a deliberate strategy to bring roles and people back
into alignment.
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We differentiated between overqualification and
underqualification, but future work might explore
differences even within these types of misfit. For
instance, the effects of overqualification on new roles
might differ between a TMT that has no marketing
role and people with marketing backgrounds and
a TMT that has one marketing role and two people
with marketing experience. Would both be equally
likely to add new roles? We also considered TMT
misfit without respect to industry expectations of
a new venture’s composition and structure. Future
research could model fit using this external lens.
We found that TMT misfit only invites responses
when new firms have achieved developmental milestones. Future research could examine factors that
stifle TMT advances even when firms have the resources associated with developmental milestones.
For example, powerful founder CEOs (e.g., those with
large ownership control) may resist TMT change (see
Boeker, 1992; Fischer & Pollock, 2004). In analysis not
shown here, we examined the effects of three-way
interactions between TMT misfit, firm development,
and a dummy variable indicating that the CEO was
a founder on new TMT hires and roles. We found evidence consistent with the idea that a founder CEO
might constrain hiring in response to TMT underqualification; however, more precise measures of CEO
power should be used to provide definitive tests of this
idea. Further, the inability of firms to alter their composition and structure without first achieving firm
developmental milestones may suggest there are other
factors endogenous to the firm that drive both misfit
and TMT change. We see the impact of misfit on TMT
hiring and adding new roles, but it is impossible to rule
out that some other factor is driving both effects. Related to this, our sample of firms has high rates of
obtaining venture capital and going public, higher
than one might expect with a sample of firms in
a broader time period or geographic region. Future
research should consider firms in other regions where
more firms fail to reach these milestones.
Although we find effects of TMT misfit on new
hires and roles, the base rates of these events are
small. For example, TMT underqualification increases
the rate of new hires by 7%, but most firms in our
sample (about 65%) do not hire anyone in a given
year. However, the fact that minimally altering the
independent variable (e.g., a TMT is misfit by one
missing qualification) results in changes to the dependent variable (e.g., hiring), and that these effects
cumulate over time, suggests that these results, if
not numerically large, are theoretically important
(Abelson, 1985; Prentice & Miller, 1992). Finally,
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we examined a relatively small sample of firms
from a narrow range of industry sectors, in a particular region, and at a moment in time of tremendous growth and economic success. Our results
may not generalize and future scholars must test the
boundary conditions of our ideas.
Managerial Implications
This paper highlights the importance of misfit in
new venture TMTs as a predictor of hiring and role
elaboration, particularly for firms that have achieved
developmental milestones. In these firms, TMT overqualification may reduce the need to hire additional
managers to increase the capabilities of the TMT;
however, these firms could add roles that better
incorporate top managers’ prior experiences to
more accurately signal the quality of the TMT.
Thus, top managers should be flexible with regard
to roles and the structure of work, particularly
when there is overqualification among managers
relative to the current role structure. In addition,
TMT underqualification is likely to result in more
stability to role structures yet more change in the
people who move into these roles. Specifically,
newcomers may need to be hired to support gaps in
skills relative to these existing roles. While these
actions may represent strategic choices in team
composition, if the roles available within the team
are fixed (e.g., new roles are not added), this may
constrain future rewards and opportunities. In
short, this may be akin to a promotion paradox
(Phillips, 2001), albeit at a different level of analysis, where TMT underqualification provides shortterm opportunities for new hires but perhaps less
long-term development of TMT structures. In addition, our results point to the importance of the developmental stage: firms are only able to change the
TMT, regardless of the level of misfit, after achieving
some developmental milestones. This points to the
importance of hiring people and creating roles with
a good fit from the beginning, rather that hoping to
grow into roles or add people over time.
CONCLUSION
In sum, this study reveals that TMT misfit acts
as a catalyst for changes to roles and people within
new venture TMTs, but that its effects are dependent upon the type of misfit and the level of
firm development. Once new ventures have achieved
developmental milestones, overqualified TMTs
elaborate their structural roles whereas underqualified
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TMTs hire new people. Prior to the achievement of
developmental milestones, misfit TMTs are less
likely to make these changes despite the need to do
so. Ultimately, this study provides a more nuanced understanding of the characteristics of entrepreneurial TMTs by attending to phenomena
that exist at the intersection of composition and
structure.
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